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In this article I argue that revisionists in just war theory must further revise their
proportionality principles. I show that on the revisionist view it is possible for a
war to be proportionate, even though all the acts of war are disproportionate,
and it is possible for a war to be disproportionate, even though all the acts of
war are proportionate. I then argue that consideration of these cases shows
the revisionist view, as it stands, to be unsatisfactory, and I explore some ways
in which revisionists might further revise their understanding of proportionality.I. INTRODUCTION
Proportionality is a central concept in just war theory. There are two pro-
portionality principles in just war theory, since proportionality makes an
appearance in the criteria of both jus ad bellum, which governs the resort
to war, and jus in bello, which governs conduct in war. In both, propor-
tionality is taken to be a necessary condition of permissibility: dispropor-
tionate wars and disproportionate acts of war are impermissible. In tra-
ditional just war theory, there are three differences between ad bellum
proportionality and in bello proportionality. The first follows from the
general distinction between the two sets of just war principles and their
different functions. Ad bellum principles govern the resort to war, and* This article began life in a point I made to Michael Robillard in the course of a fas-
cinating discussion about proportionality and population ethics. I am very grateful to Mi-
chael for that discussion, among others. The article has since benefitted from discussion
with Christian Barry, Cécile Fabre, Rob Jubb, Seth Lazar, Darrel Mollendorf, Victor Tadros,
and an audience at University College London. The article has been much improved
thanks to the editors and referees at Ethics. Special thanks are owed to Jeff McMahan,
who has provided detailed comments on multiple drafts of this article and has devoted dis-
proportionate amounts of time and effort to discussing these issues with me.
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Tomlin Proportionality in War 35in bello principles govern acts of war. Consequently, ad bellum propor-
tionality is one of the relevant tests for deciding whether going to war will
be justified, while in bello proportionality is one of the relevant tests for
deciding whether an act of war will be justified.
The second difference also follows from the general ad bellum/in
bello distinction. It concerns the unit of assessment. Ad bellum propor-
tionality assesses the proportionality of “the war as a whole,” while in
bello proportionality assesses the proportionality of “acts of war.” The
third difference, which has attracted attention in recent scholarship, con-
cerns the kind of assessment. Crudely put, in traditional just war theory,
ad bellum proportionality is a moral assessment, while in bello propor-
tionality is a nonmoral assessment. The ad bellum assessment weighs
the harms the war will cause against the good it will achieve.1 However, tra-
ditional just war theory allows that soldiers fighting in an unjust war, with
no just cause, can nevertheless fight justly. So, instead of weighing the
harms that acts of war will cause against the good they will do, the in bello
assessment weighs the harms the act of war will cause against its contribu-
tion to “the end of victory.”2 The laws of war follow this traditional separa-
tion of ad bellum and in bello proportionality by making the in bello cri-
terion one in which combatants must assess the damage that they will do
against the “concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.”3
To summarize, traditional just war theory conceives of proportion-
ality in war as follows:1. In this article I will assume that harm vs. good is the relevant proportionality com-
parison. This skates over some difficult issues concerning the “currencies” of proportion-
ality. For example, there has been debate over whether non-just-cause goods can be in-
cluded as goods; see Jeff McMahan, “Proportionality and Just Cause: A Comment on
Kamm,” Journal of Moral Philosophy 11 (2014): 428–53. Jonathan Quong has argued (for de-
fense against potentially liable attackers) that the relevant comparison is “force” vs. rights
protected ( Jonathan Quong, “Proportionality, Liability, and Defensive Harm,” Philosophy
and Public Affairs 43 [2015]: 144–73), while (again for proportionality calculations involv-
ing the potentially liable) Frances Kamm compares harm done to the wrongdoer vs. the
wrong to be avoided (F. M. Kamm, Ethics for Enemies [Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2011], 133–34). The cases presented here do not directly engage with Kamm’s and
Quong’s views, since they envisage harms to the nonliable. However, some could be made
into a case in which potentially liable parties are harmed. So far as I can see, everything I say
here would apply, mutatis mutandis, to the proportionality calculations recommended by
Kamm and Quong. One case (Faulty Guns) could not be a case involving the potentially
liable, since it affects future persons, and future persons cannot possibly be liable.
2. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, 4th ed. (New York: Basic, 2006), 129.
3. Geneva Convention, Additional Protocol 1, Article 51(5)(b) (italics mine). Similar
language (relating to military advantage, although this time “overall military advantage”) is
found in ICC, Rome Statute (1998), Article 8 2(b)(iv). For more on proportionality in the
laws of war, see Adil Ahmad Haque, Law and Morality at War (New York: Oxford University














36 Ethics October 2020Traditional ad Bellum Proportionality
(1) is the proportionality calculation used to help determine
whether the resort to war is permissible;
(2) assesses the war as a whole;
(3) is a moral assessment.Traditional in Bello Proportionality
(4) is the proportionality calculation used to help determine
whether acts of war are permissible;
(5) assesses acts of war;
(6) is a nonmoral assessment.4Revisionist just war theory has taken issue with claim (6). Whatever its
merits as a piece of international law, it has recently been claimed that
this nonmoral calculation cannot capture in bello proportionality in
the ethics of war. Just as the general idea of soldiers on the unjust side
fighting justly has recently come under attack, the idea of an act of war
being in bello proportionate, while advancing the cause of an unjust
war, has received particular criticism.5 If the ends of the war are evil,
then an act of harm cannot be made morally proportionate by securing
enoughmilitary advantage for those fighting for that evil. Indeed, on the
traditional understanding, those who further evil ends to a greater extent
may be acting proportionately, and thus potentially permissibly, while
those who further evil ends to a lesser extent, or do not further evil ends
at all, may be acting disproportionately, and thus impermissibly. Consider
a Nazi soldier with two options. One involves foreseeably killing five civil-
ians, but with a significantmilitary advantage for theNazis. This would, of
course, be bad from the jus ad bellum perspective, but it could be in bello
proportionate, and thus potentially permissible, on the traditional view.
The other option is to fire on a different position, also foreseeably killing
five civilians, but without securing any military advantage. This is better
from the ad bellum perspective—five die, but evil ends are not furthered.. I do not argue that these claims are explicitly made in each and every text of tradi-
just war theory, but all are commonplace. To the extent that claims (1), (2), (4), and
e not made explicitly, this is possibly because the distinctions between (1), (2) and
4) have not been sufficiently appreciated. This is one of the central themes of the
nt article. See Sec. VI.
. For influential works in this vein, see Jeff McMahan, Killing in War (New York: Ox-
niversity Press, 2009); Cecile Fabre, Cosmopolitan War (Oxford: Oxford University
2012); Helen Frowe, Defensive Killing (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). For
sms concerning the traditional understanding of proportionality in particular, see
as Hurka, “Proportionality in the Morality of War,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 33
): 34–66, 44–45; Jeff McMahan, “The Ethics of Killing in War,” Ethics 114 (2004):
33, 709–18; Jeff McMahan, “Just Cause for War,” Ethics and International Affairs 19
): 1–21, 6.
Tomlin Proportionality in War 37But this second act is in bello disproportionate, and thus impermissible,
on the traditional view.
Revisionists about just war theory deny that ad bellum and in bello
proportionality assessments ought to assess harm against differential
standards. The revisionist understanding of proportionality leaves the
ad bellum standard as was but insists that in bello proportionality is
the same kind of calculation as the ad bellum calculation: it is a calcula-
tion in which harms (or, more broadly, bad effects) must be justified by
reference to the moral goods they will achieve. That is, revisionists insist
not only that in bello proportionality is also a moral assessment but also
that it is a moral assessment that employs the same “currencies” as ad
bellum proportionality. As it stands, therefore, the revisionist critique
of traditional just war theory appears to leave claims (1)–(5) above un-
touched and seeks to replace (6) with this claim:Revisionist in Bello Proportionality
(6*) is a moral assessment (of the same kind as the ad bellum pro-
portionality assessment).My aim in this article is to show that the revisionist project cannot simply
switch claim (6) for (6*) and leave the rest of the structure of ad bellum
and in bello proportionality in place. I will argue that revisionist propor-
tionality must be more revisionist still, and I will canvass a variety of ways
which revisionists could respond to the problems I unearth.
In particular, I will argue that with two proportionality conditions
with the same currencies, a tension emerges between claims (1) and
(2): the idea that ad bellum proportionality governs the morality of
the resort to war, and that the relevant assessment is one that compares
the harms and goods of the “war as a whole.” I will argue that the resort
to war ought to take account of whether, and to what extent, individual
acts of war will be proportionate or disproportionate, and that this infor-
mation cannot be garnered by looking at the war as a whole.
I arrive at the conclusion that the revisionist stance on proportion-
ality is, as it stands, unsatisfactory by examining two kinds of cases: those
in which each and every act of war is proportionate, but the war as a
whole is disproportionate, and those in which the war as a whole is pro-
portionate, but each and every act of act of war is disproportionate.
Showing that such cases exist is itself an important contribution to con-
temporary just war theory, since, as I shall show, the leading revisionist,
Jeff McMahan, has assumed that such cases cannot exist under the revi-
sionist view and has argued that the fact that the revisionist view cannot
give rise to such cases is to its advantage over traditional just war theory.
Having shown that the revisionist view does not rule out such cases, I
then show that revisionists cannot, in the face of these cases, leave their
38 Ethics October 2020view unchanged. I consider how revisionists can respond to the issues
raised. I canvass a variety of potential responses, concluding that the
most plausible requires two proportionality principles governing the re-
sort to war: one which looks at the “war as a whole,” the other at the
disproportionality (or general unjustifiability) of the acts of war. What-
ever route we take, I argue, revisionists cannot settle for replacing (6)
with (6*): more radical revisions to just war theory’s understanding of
proportionality are required.
There are different perspectives from which we can make propor-
tionality judgments, and in this article I will be concerned with two types
of proportionality calculation. In a fact-relative proportionality calcula-
tion, we must look at what actually happened—at what bad effects the ac-
tion(s) actually caused and what good effects were thereby achieved. In
an evidence-relative proportionality calculation, we must look at whether
the act was proportionate, given the evidence available to the agent.6
My claims in this article apply to both fact-relative and evidence-relative
proportionality.
II. REVISIONIST AD BELLUM
AND IN BELLO PROPORTIONALITY
My central aim in this article is to expose some important puzzles for
proportionality once we see both ad bellum and in bello proportionality
as moral assessments of the same kind. These puzzles come to light when
we see cases in which the war as a whole is disproportionate, even though
each and every act of war is proportionate, and cases in which the war
as a whole is proportionate, even though each and every act of war is
disproportionate.
The person who has offered the most sustained critique of tradi-
tional just war theory is Jeff McMahan. McMahan, however, has assumed
that the kind of cases I want to explore here could not exist on his revi-
sionist view and, furthermore, has argued that this is a point in favor of
the revisionist view.
The primary criticism that revisionists offer to the traditional under-
standing of in bello proportionality is what we can call “the problem
of missing moral grounds.”7 The traditional nonmoral view of in bello6. For the idea of fact-relative and evidence-relative permissibility, see Derek Parfit,On
What Matters, vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), chap. 5. For the idea of fact-
relative and evidence-relative proportionality, see Jeff McMahan, “Proportionality and
Time,” Ethics 125 (2015): 1–25; Hurka, “Proportionality in the Morality of War.” I have ar-
gued elsewhere that evidence-relative proportionality is complex. See Patrick Tomlin,
“Subjective Proportionality,” Ethics 129 (2019): 254–83.
7. I am indebted to an Ethics referee here for helping me to see that there are these
two independent criticisms in revisionist thinking. This main line of criticism is articulated
Tomlin Proportionality in War 39proportionality allows that an act of war can be in bello proportionate,
and morally permissible, even when the war is an unjust war, with an un-
just cause. But how, the revisionist asks, can a nonmoral proportionality
calculation deliver a moral conclusion? How can furthering unjust ends
to a sufficient degree grant an act of war the moral stamp of permissibil-
ity? Proportionality requires us to do enough moral good to justify the
harms we impose—this, revisionists have shown, is an inescapably moral
issue.
McMahan, however, has also offered a secondary critique, which crit-
icizes the way that the traditional view allows our in bello proportionality










2016)If the unjust side’s war is inevitably [ad bellum] disproportionate, it
seems that many or most of the acts of war that together constitute
that war must also be disproportionate. For if all the acts of war that
together constitute one side’s war were proportionate, that would
seem to guarantee that the war as a whole must be proportionate.
Yet traditional just war theory denies this. It maintains instead that
it is possible for every act of war by combatants on the unjust side to
satisfy the in bello proportionality constraint, even though their war
itself is disproportionate.8Elsewhere, he states that if ad bellum proportionality and in bello pro-
portionality adopt the same currencies (i.e., if (6*) is accepted), then
“a war would be guaranteed to be proportionate if all its constituent acts
of war would be proportionate.”9 McMahan labels the idea that a war
could be disproportionate when all of its constituent acts were proportion-
ate “bizarre.”10 The idea here is that we should expect a certain kind of re-
lationship between our proportionality judgments concerning wars and
the acts that constitute them. Unlike the first critique, this would also ap-
ply to wars that have a just cause but are nevertheless disproportionate.
McMahan, therefore, seems to accept the following claim:11
(7) If every act of a war is proportionate, then the war as a whole
must be proportionate.. Ibid., 423–24. For a similar passage, see Jeff McMahan, “Proportionate Defense,”
l of Transnational Law and Policy 23 (2013–14): 1–36, 20–21.
. McMahan, “Proportionate Defense,” 17.
0. Ibid., 21.
1. McMahan used to accept these claims without reservation. He now includes cave-
ting an unpublished ancestor of this article as the reason. McMahan, “Proportionality
ecessity,” 423 n. 10.
f McMahan in “Proportionality and Necessity in Jus in Bello,” in The Oxford Handbook of
hics of War, ed. Helen Frowe and Seth Lazar (New York: Oxford University Press,
, 418–39, 424.
40 Ethics October 2020McMahan also claims that if a war is disproportionate, it “seems that many
or most” of the acts of war must be disproportionate. However, although
in most actual disproportionate wars this will probably be the case, there
is no conceptual link between the number or proportion of dispropor-
tionate acts of war and a war’s overall disproportionality. As a matter of
principle, the claim that “many or most” of a disproportionate war’s acts
will be disproportionate is surely false: it is easy to imagine a war consist-
ing almost entirely of proportionate acts, with one disproportionate act,
where that were enough to make the war as a whole disproportionate.
However, the following seems like a safer claim, which is not strictly im-
plied by claim (7) but seems to be its natural corollary:
(8) If every act of a war is disproportionate, then the war as a whole
must be disproportionate.Claims (7) and (8) are, at first blush, plausible. The traditional view is
clearly at odds with them, and this appears to be a strike against the tra-
ditional view: it is a counterintuitive entailment of the traditional view
that it allows these seemingly paradoxical states of affairs. And since
the revisionist view proposes the same kind of calculation for both pro-
portionality principles, it is understandable that we might expect a cer-
tain consistency between the two calculations: the ad bellum proportion-
ality calculation will simply be the sum of all the in bello calculations,
meaning that this view will be consistent with claims (7) and (8).
Claims (7) and (8) seem even more plausible when we consider
what it would mean to reject them. Recall that ad bellum proportionality
and in bello proportionality are taken to be necessary conditions of the
permissibility of wars and acts of war, respectively. Therefore, to reject
(8) and allow that there are wars that are proportionate, even though
each and every act of war is disproportionate, would (without further
amendments to just war theory) be to allow that a war could be permis-
sible, and a state could be permitted to send its troops to war, even when
it knows that none of them would be permitted to fight and all of them
ought to refuse to go. Similarly, without (7), we could have a war in which
every soldier acts permissibly, but the state would have acted impermis-
sibly in sending them to that war.
Removed from the particular setting of war, and translated to gen-
eral claims about the proportionality of particular harmful actions and
the proportionality of courses of harmful action, claims (7) and (8)
may seem not only plausible but also uncontroversial. Imagine that I
am trying to pursue some good end and am trying to achieve it by punch-
ing someone in the face. If each and every punch does not do enough
good to justify the harm caused, and is therefore disproportionate, then
it is hard to see how the overall course of punches could do enough good
Tomlin Proportionality in War 41to be proportionate. Similarly, imagine that each and every punch is pro-
portionate. It is hard to see how the overall course of punches could then
be disproportionate.
This gives us some more general claims, of which claims (7) and (8)
are more specific versions:
(7*) If each individual act within a harmful course of action is pro-
portionate, then the course of action must be proportionate.
(8*) If each individual act within a harmful course of action is
disproportionate, then the course of action must be dispro-
portionate.In the following sections, I will deny that the revisionist view of propor-
tionality is consistent with claims (7), (7*), (8), and (8*). We might be
tempted to think that revisionists can then simply reject these claims.
However, as I will show in Section VI, revisionists cannot settle merely
for rejecting (7) and (8). The revisionist theory of proportionality must
be further revised.
III. LATER ACTS IN A COURSE OF ACTION
In this section and the following two, I will show a series of ways in which
wars might violate (7) and (8) even when in bello proportionality is un-
derstood as a moral calculation. The first kind of case I will focus on are
ones in which later acts in a course of action have very different effects
from earlier ones, in terms of the amount of good or harm that they
do, but where how much good or harm they do depends on the number
of other harmful acts performed.
Recall, first, claims (7) and (7*):
(7) If every act of a war is proportionate, then the war as a whole
must be proportionate.
(7*) If each individual act within a harmful course of action is pro-
portionate, then the course of action must be proportionate.Now consider this example:Bombing Campaign: Country A wages war against Country B. The war
consists of 100 bombing raids. Together, these bombing raids cause
a loss of life that is disproportionate to the just cause that Country A
is pursuing. However, 100 bombing raids do a lot more good than
ninety bombing raids. Any bombing raids after the ninetieth save
many more lives, per raid, than the first ninety.This war is disproportionate. According to claims (7) and (7*), therefore,
it cannot be the case that every individual act is proportionate. But I
42 Ethics October 2020believe that they can be. Let us look at the fact-relative proportionality cal-
culations first. Imagine that we are pilots who have participated in Bomb-
ing Campaign. We are trying to assess whether we have participated in a
disproportionate war, and whether our own actions in the war were dis-
proportionate. In order to assess the proportionality of an act, or set of
acts, we must assess how much harm and how much good is done com-
pared with some counterfactual. In assessing the proportionality of a
war as a whole, how to pick out the relevant counterfactual is a complex
issue, but it certainly involves not going to war.12 For an individual acting
in a war, the relevant counterfactual must involve not performing that act
of war. Imagine in this case that the pilots had only two options: fly or
don’t. Then, in order to see whether a particular harmful act was propor-
tionate, we must assess the world in which they flew against the world in
which they didn’t.
It is important to note that in saying that proportionality assess-
ments involve counterfactual comparisons that involve how much harm
we do, we do not commit ourselves to a counterfactual account of harm,
and certainly not a simple counterfactual account of harm. Even on a
noncomparative or temporal comparison view of harm, I can compare
a world in which I do harm with a world in which I do not, and I must
do so to see whether my harmful act is proportionate.13
It is clear that in order to assess the proportionality of some harmful
act, the relevant comparison is with a world in which the harmful act does
not occur. However, when we are considering individual acts of war, the
relevant counterfactual must still include other acts of war that are per-
formed by others, since the proportionality and permissibility of some
conduct in war will often depend on other acts of war being performed
by other people. For example, killing one individual as part of a raid on
an enemy position can be proportionate only if others play their part and
also fire on the enemy position—otherwise it is a senseless loss of life that12. David Mellow, “Counterfactuals and the Proportionality Criterion,” Ethics and In-
ternational Affairs 20 (2006): 439–54; Thomas Hurka, “Proportionality and Necessity,” in
War: Essays in Political Philosophy, ed. Larry May and Emily Crookston (Cambridge: Cam-
bridge University Press, 2008), 127–44; Kieran Oberman, “War and Poverty,” Philosophical
Studies 176 (2019): 197–217.
13. One possible objection here is that while I may be able to avoid a simple counter-
factual account of harm, the example nevertheless relies on a simple counterfactual ac-
count of causation, since the good done by flying is measured in this counterfactual
way. However, this is assumed only if we make the further assumption that proportionality
must only take into account good caused. I cannot develop an account of causation, or its
relationship to proportionality, here. Nevertheless, this counterfactual understanding of in
bello proportionality seems, at least, plausible. Perhaps the right upshot of the present ar-
ticle is that we should further revise our understanding of in bello proportionality. This is
examined in Sec. VI.
Tomlin Proportionality in War 43will not do any good, and therefore is not proportionate.14 The propor-
tionality of a soldier’s act must be assessed against the backdrop of war.
If we compared his actions with a counterfactual in which not only did
he not act but also the other acts of war were not performed, we would
divorce his acts from the context in which they were performed—and
it is only in that wider context, often, that his actions could possibly be
permissible.
Given that the counterfactual for each act of war must involve other
acts of war, the only plausible counterfactual for assessing the fact-relative
proportionality of an individual bombing is the world in which the other
ninety-nine raids still went ahead. If we are trying to assess the propor-
tionality of this particular bombing raid, we should compare the world
in which this bombing raid went ahead and the world in which it did
not, but in which as much as possible is held constant.15
Imagine that each bombing raid killed ten innocent people as a side
effect and that this number is stable across all plausible understandings
of harm and the harm that we cause.16 Overall, then, 1,000 people were
killed in the 100 bombing raids. Imagine that each of the first ninety
bombing raids saved one person, while bombing raids 91–100 each saved
ninety people. Overall, then, 990 people were saved. This is not propor-
tionate, overall: fewer people were saved than were killed. We partici-
pated in a disproportionate and therefore unjust war. But when we turn
our attention to each individual bombing raid, we find that each was fact-
relative proportionate.
This strange result comes about because of the different counter-
factuals used. When we remove one act from a sequence of acts like this,
no matter which act we remove, we remove the good done by the final
act. This is because if Bomber 45 had not flown, Bomber 46 would simply
have become Bomber 45, Bomber 47 would have become Bomber 46,14. In terms of the relevant counterfactual, there is an important distinction here
between individuals involved in collective action like war and those involved in individ-
ual courses of action (e.g., in self-defense). In collective action, we must take the actions
of others to be de facto: what they actually did or will do. We cannot take our actions for
granted in the same way.
15. Even if this is not quite the right counterfactual, the counterintuitive results I
show here could still be generated. What matters is that the counterfactual for the war
as a whole differs from the counterfactual for each act of war.
16. This stipulation is useful because it (a) means that the case is not a case in which
the harm is overdetermined, which, while the obvious case for an article like this to focus
on, is fraught with particular difficulties; (b) allows us to be ecumenical over the definition
of harm; and (c) relatedly, avoids us having to decide whether the “direct harm” or the
“marginal harm” of an individual act should be what is assessed for in bello proportionality.
For an overview of differing accounts of harm and how overdetermination cases present
difficulties for them, see Victor Tadros, “What Might Have Been,” in Philosophical Founda-
tions of the Law of Torts, ed. John Oberdiek (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).
44 Ethics October 2020and so on, until Bomber 100 became Bomber 99. So, if Bomber 45 had
not flown, 90 fewer people would have been saved.
Imagine that the additional amount of harm caused by each raid
91–100 is proportionate, given the additional good done by them (nine
people are saved for each person killed). If this is true, then each and
every bombing raid is proportionate: if any one raid had not gone ahead,
there would still have been ninety-nine other raids. Removing one raid
from the set merely removes an act that does some harm (kills ten) but
produces a lot of good (saves ninety lives). And so each raid was in bello
proportionate.
The above analysis relies on the idea that Bomber 45 can say to him-
self, “Had I not flown, ninety fewer people would have been saved. So I
killed ten, but this saved ninety.” Is this reasoning sound? After all, we
know that the raid he actually flew directly saved only one life. Neverthe-
less, I think this reasoning is sound, at least if we have a counterfactual
understanding of proportionality. Essentially what Bomber 45 did was
change the effectiveness of Bomber 91’s raid. In a world in which Bomber
45 didn’t fly, Bomber 91’s raid is the ninetieth raid and so only saves one.
But in a world in which Bomber 45 flew, Bomber 91’s raid saved ninety.
The question is whether Bomber 45 can count the additional ninety
saved when considering the fact-relative proportionality of his own act.
I think he can. Imagine a different situation: Soldier 1 is going to rescue
some people from Room 1. This involves killing the guard to Room 1, but
it will save ten innocent people. Soldier 2 cannot directly save anyone, but
he can kill the guard to Room 2, which will allow the ten people in Room
2 to move to Room 1, so that Soldier 1 will also save them. Soldier 2
changes the effectiveness of Soldier 1’s act of killing. Is it proportionate
for Soldier 2 to kill in order to do so? It seems so. And so it seems it must
be proportionate for Bomber 45 to fly.17
It is important to note that the immediate conclusion drawn from
Bombing Campaign is that, on the revisionist view, each bomber acts in
bello proportionately. It may not be the case that he acts permissibly,
or is not accountable for his contribution to the overall disproportionate
series of acts. Nor do I take a stand here on what is a very difficult ques-
tion: are these bombers liable to be harmed? Collectively, the bombers17. There are two versions of this case, with potentially important moral differences.
Imagine that each bomber kills ten people in one house, on a street numbered 1–100. In
version 1, if Bomber 45 does not fly, the people at number 45 are spared, but ninety fewer
people are saved. This case is more straightforward—flying kills ten (those at number 45)
and saves ninety. In version 2, if Bomber 45 does not fly, Bomber 46 will kill the people at
number 45, Bomber 47 will kill the people at number 46, and so on. The people at number
100 will be spared. Flying will save ninety, but the harms done are a more complex matter—
if he flies, Bomber 45 will kill ten who would be killed anyway (those at number 45) and will
cause the deaths of (but not directly kill) those at number 100.
Tomlin Proportionality in War 45are engaged in a disproportionate act of violence. But individually, they
are not. My claim is simply that if any bomber acts impermissibly and is
accountable, and if any bomber is liable to be harmed, this is not due
to the disproportionality of his individual act. Further principles would
be needed to explain why this is the case.
It will, perhaps, be instructive to compare Bombing Campaign to a
case that is in all respects identical, other than that in this case each
bombing raid is simultaneous rather than sequential. Call this Simulta-
neous Bombs. In this case, since each and every bomber is symmetrically
situated, we must offer the same judgment on the fact-relative propor-
tionality for each of their actions. There are no identifiable ten “addi-
tional” bombers who change the case from a ninety-bomber case to a
100-bomber case, but 100 bombers will nevertheless do a lot more good
than ninety bombers. So we must ask for each what the relevant counter-
factual is, and whether their individual act of war is proportionate com-
pared with this counterfactual. From a fact-relative perspective, when
we know that all 100 bombers did in fact fly, I see no option but to com-
pare each action with a counterfactual in which they had not flown but
the other ninety-nine had. In such a case, each and every bomber acts
proportionately since the marginal good done by their act is enough to
justify killing ten people. This is important, as it shows that even if I am
wrong that the revisionist view of proportionality is incompatible with
claims (7) and (7*) in Bombing Campaign, it surely is in Simultaneous Bombs.
Let us now turn to the evidence-relative calculation. There is an easy
way to show that evidence-relative judgments about the whole war and
the acts of war can come apart—since evidence is both agent- and time-
relative, if the decisions about the war and the acts of war are taken at dif-
ferent times or by different people, it is clear that they could come to
correct conclusions about evidence-relative proportionality that differ,
based on different evidence about the likely effects of the campaign.
However, let us imagine that each and every person involved has the
same information about the costs and benefits of each raid, and conse-
quently about the campaign as a whole. In order to show incompatibility
with (7) and (7*), the simplest move would ordinarily be to stipulate that
the pilots know the facts as described in the original case to be beyond
reasonable doubt. This would ensure that we get the same result from
the evidence-relative perspective as from the fact-relative perspective. If
we put ourselves in the position of one pilot, deliberating about whether
or not to drop his bombs, and in particular whether doing so will be pro-
portionate, we can see how this works: it will be proportionate if the best
available evidence states that it is beyond reasonable doubt that at least
ninety of his fellow pilots will drop their bombs. Let us imagine that
one pilot has such evidence (imagine that another ninety have declared
that they will drop their bombs, and there is no reason to doubt that they
46 Ethics October 2020will). Then, his act will be evidence-relative proportionate, even though
the war is evidence-relative disproportionate.
However, the reason I wanted to cover evidence-relative proportion-
ality separately is that it is less clear that it is possible for all 100 pilots to
be in this position. And this is, after all, what we need to be true in order
to show an incompatibility between (7) and (7*) and revisionism at
the evidence-relative level, since every single act needs to be evidence-
relative proportionate. If each pilot is deliberating about what to do,
and so, from his own perspective, is unsure as to whether he will fly,
and if the proportionality of his flight depends on at least ninety others
flying, how can he (and therefore any pilot) know whether or not his act
will be proportionate?
Imagine that no individual bomber will know whether the other pi-
lots will drop their bombs. Each bomber deliberates about what to do.
But the best available evidence states that at least 90 percent of bombers
will end up dropping their bombs. You may wonder how each can be
confident of this, if each is deliberating about what to do. However, it
is quite possible for a group of people to each face a decision, such as
whether or not to respond to an incentive, while confidently predicting
what the overall response will be (e.g., 90 percent will respond in a cer-
tain way). If each pilot is confident that at least 90 percent will drop their
bombs, each acts evidence-relative proportionately in dropping his
bombs, but the 100 bombing raids together would remain disproportion-
ate, at both the fact-relative and evidence-relative levels.
A reverse case can be used to show how the revisionist view of propor-
tionality clashes with claims (8) and (8*). Recall that these claims state
that if every act of a war (individual act) is disproportionate, then the
war (course of action) must overall be disproportionate. But now con-
sider a version of Bombing Campaign in which the first ninety bombing
raids each kill ten and save 1,000. The final ten each kill ten and save
one. The campaign overall is proportionate, since it kills 1,000 and saves
90,010. But each individual bombing raid is disproportionate, since if that
bomber had not flown, then the bomber would not have killed ten peo-
ple, and only one fewer person would have been saved.
IV. AVERTING THREATS CAUSED BY WAR
I will now introduce another set of cases that can be used to pull apart our
ad bellum and in bello proportionality judgments, even when both are
moral assessments. These are cases in which threats are averted that would
not have existed were it not for the decision to go to war.18 This kind of case18. I am grateful to Seth Lazar for suggesting I look at this kind of case.
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ed. EdPreemptive Strike : Country A has a just cause for war against Country B,
but the means at Country A’s disposal mean that the harms caused
by the war will be disproportionate to the achievement of its just
cause. If Country A declares war, Country B will preemptively strike
against Country C. The means at Country A’s disposal are propor-
tionate to the just causes of Countries A and C combined.If Country A wages war, each act of war can bemeasured against its contri-
bution toward defeating the unjust threats to both Countries A and C.
Imagine that each act of war will be proportionate on this measure. But
Country C will be under threat only because Country A chose to wage
war. Country A therefore cannot appeal to saving Country C in deciding
whether it will be proportionate to go to war. As Seth Lazar puts it (making
a point about necessity, but which applies equally to proportionality), “We
cannot count averting threats that will arise only if we decide to go to war
among the goods that justify the decision to go to war.”20 Again, this is due
to the differential counterfactuals that apply in bello and ad bellum.Once
we are in a war, the lives of the civilians threatened in Country C are rele-
vant to the in bello calculations. But those lives are not at risk in the ab-
sence of the war, which is the relevant counterfactual for the ad bellum
calculation.
V. NONIDENTITY CASES
The final kind of case on which I will focus are nonidentity cases. If we
accept some widely accepted (though controversial) claims about popu-
lation ethics, then our revisionist jus ad bellum and jus in bello propor-
tionality judgments can again come apart in ways that claims (7), (7*),
(8), and (8*) suggest that they should not be able to.
To begin with, recall claims (8) and (8*):
(8) If every act of a war is disproportionate, then the war as a whole
must be disproportionate.
(8*) If each individual act within a harmful course of action is
disproportionate, then the course of action must be dispro-
portionate.9. I am grateful to Jeff Howard for a useful line of questioning that helped in formu-
this example.
0. Seth Lazar, “War,” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2016 Edition),
ward N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/war/, 48.
48 Ethics October 2020Nonidentity cases can show these principles to be incompatible with the
revisionist view of in bello proportionality. In order to agree with my ar-
gument for this, you will have to accept the following:2
feren
gratefDifference View: there is a moral difference between acts that lead to
impersonal loss (which make things worse from the point of view of
general welfare, but not worse for any particular person) and acts
that make things worse for a particular person. All else equal, and
in cases in which all lives are worth living, impersonal loss is not
as bad as persons being made worse off.21Note that the Difference View does not imply that acts that decrease the
general welfare but do not make things worse for any particular person
are not bad (though it is consistent with that view). It simply says that
such acts are not as bad as those that make things worse for a particular
person. The difference could be very large or very slight.
To illustrate the difference that the Difference View takes to be mor-
ally relevant, consider a case in which Chris and Hilary face a choice—
either they could conceive now and have a child (Child A), who will have
some health problem, or they could wait a month and have a different
child (Child B), who will not have that health problem. Imagine that
both Child A and Child B would have a life worth living, but Child B’s
lifetime well-being would be significantly greater than that of Child A.
Now consider a case in which Chris is pregnant andmust decide whether
to take some pills that have a small benefit for her, but which will se-
riously harm the child (Child C) and make it worse off than it would
have been otherwise. If she does not take the pills, Child C will be as
well-off as Child B. If she does take them, Child C will be as well-off as
Child A.
The Difference View claims that it is worse to make Child C worse off
than it is to choose Child A over Child B, even though the welfare levels
being chosen between are identical, and A, B, and C will all have lives
worth living. In the first case, if the couple chooses to create Child A, they
bring about a life that would not otherwise have existed, albeit one that
contains an imperfection. There is impersonal loss, in that Child B’s life
would have had higher levels of welfare, but Child A is not made worse
off. In the second case, Child C is made worse off and is deprived of a
possible future without this bad element in her life.1. I have called this view the Difference View since it is the antithesis to Parfit’s “No Dif-
ce View.” See Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons (Oxford: Clarendon, 1984), 367. I am
ul to an Ethics referee for helping me to clarify the language here.
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I think that the proposed moral difference between causing a worse
rather than a better life to come into existence andmaking people worse
off is clear enough, and that many will accept it. Since I cannot defend it
fully here, it is worth noting that the most prominent proponent of the
revisionist view of just war theory, and of proportionality in particular,
Jeff McMahan, is also a proponent of the Difference View.23
In order to show the incompatibility, we must be able to point to a
war (or course of action) that is proportionate, even though each and







ity inFaulty Guns: Country A wages a war against Country B. Country A has
a just cause. Country A will use only grenade launchers. However, all
of its grenade launchers are faulty. Every time the trigger is pulled, a
grenade is launched toward the target, but a second grenade is also
launched, at an angle. These second grenades will not go off imme-
diately, but they will remain on the battlefield and will go off if stood
upon. These second grenades cannot be recovered. Country A fore-
sees three things.24 First, in between ten and twenty years’ time, 1,000
children from Country B will step onto the unexploded grenades
and will be seriously injured or killed. Second, the war will disperse
the population of Country B, such that people will meet sexual part-
ners they would not otherwise have met had the war not occurred.
Therefore, the next generation of Country B will contain different
children than it would have hadCountry A not waged the war. Third,
the children who will later be killed and injured by the grenades are
a subset of those who would not have existed were it not for the war.Is Country A’s war proportionate? In deciding whether it is, we must of
course take account of those who will be seriously injured or killed dur-
ing the war. But we must also take account of the children who will be
killed or injured further down the line. If we accept the Difference View,
however, the injuries to and deaths of these children should be viewed
differently from the ad bellum and in bello perspectives.
From the ad bellum perspective, the killing and injuring of these
children should be seen as impersonal losses. Since without the war
these children would not have existed, then (presuming they have lives2. For a recent defense, see Michael Otsuka, “How It Makes a Moral Difference That
s Worse Off Than One Could Have Been,” Politics, Philosophy and Economics 17 (2017):
15.
3. See, e.g., Jeff McMahan, “Causing People to Exist and Saving People’s Lives,” Jour-
Ethics 17 (2013): 5–35.
4. In including the stipulation not only that these three things are true but also that
try A foresees them, I bring together evidence-relative and fact-relative proportional-
this discussion.
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dren have worse lives than those who would have existed had the war not
taken place—and so the loss is impersonal. These impersonal losses
might, on the Difference View, still stand in need of justification and need
to be shown to be proportionate to the goods generated by the war, but
they are less weighty, or easier to justify, than making people worse off.25
However, from an in bello perspective, the killing and injuring of
these children should be seen as cases in which identifiable individuals
are made worse off. That is because even though the war disperses the
population, meaning that different children are created from those
who would otherwise have been created had the war not taken place, it
is unlikely that any individual grenade launch can be said to have the
same effect. An individual act of killing will determine the identity of,
at most, a handful of individuals (e.g., those who would have been cre-
ated by someone who is killed will now not exist), but it is unlikely that
any individual act in war will later injure one of the very people whose
identities it determined. And we can stipulate that Country A knows that
no such case will occur. So, while, in this case, the nonidentity issue has bite
from the ad bellum perspective, from the in bello perspective it does not.
Now consider my (unrealistic) stipulation, that the war is fought
only with the faulty grenade launchers.26 Since the killing and injuring
of the future children must be viewed differently from the ad bellum
and in bello perspectives, then we may well come to different conclu-
sions regarding the proportionality of the war and of the acts of war.
In particular, we may think the war overall proportionate (due to the dis-
count implied by the Difference View) while each individual grenade
launch is disproportionate (as the discount does not apply). And so
we find claims (8) and (8*) to be false even if we accept the revisionist
picture of in bello proportionality: a war can be ad bellum proportionate
even though each and every action is in bello disproportionate.
It is worth noting exactly how this difference in ad bellum and in
bello proportionality judgments comes about. It is not because the
“war as a whole” is somehow disconnected from the individual actions
that make up the war. As in the previous sections, the difference between
our ad bellum and in bello judgments comes about because of the rele-
vant counterfactuals. When assessing the proportionality of the war as a25. Recall that in setting up the Difference View I stipulated that it was consistent both
with the view that impersonal loss did not matter and with the view that impersonal loss is
only slightly less bad than making someone worse off (all else being equal).
26. It seems to add to the intuitive force of the case if we stipulate that this is the only
way for Country A to fight this war. But in fact this should make no difference to our judg-
ments concerning the proportionality of the war or of the acts of war, since proportionality
and necessity are independent criteria of just war or force.
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the relevant counterfactual. But when assessing an individual act, we
need to imagine only that that particular act does not take place—the
other acts of war still occur. The acts of war, collectively, determine the
identities of those who are later injured. But no individual act of war
does this: it does not later injure people whose identities it determined.
In the case as I have described it, the war as a whole determines
identities, but the individual acts do not. But this structure is not, in fact,
central to the case. What matters is that the particular acts of war do not
determine the identities of some persons and later injure those very
same persons, while the war as a whole does determine the identities
of those who will later be injured as a result of the war.






WorldAction A creates Person 1 and later injures Person 2.
Action B creates Person 2 and later injures Person 1.In this example, the overall course of action does not possess some
identity-determining power which the individual acts do not—in this case
it is the individual acts that determine identities. But the same point
holds as in Faulty Guns. Viewed as a course of action “Actions A and B” cre-
ate and injure Persons 1 and 2, and so it is a nonidentity case. Viewed as
individual acts, however, they are not nonidentity cases: identifiable per-
sons who would exist whether or not the act was performed are made
worse off.
This point—that a case can be a nonidentity case when viewed as a
course of action, but not when the actions are viewed as individual ac-
tions—has implications far beyond the ethics of war. For example, con-
sider Parfit’sDepletion case,27 or the all-too-real case of climate change pol-
icy. These public policy cases are often analyzed in just the same way as,
for example, cases of procreative choices involving genetic defects.28
The above arguments show, however, that these two types of cases are im-
portantly different. The choice for our politicians concerns how, in es-
sence, to affect the choices of others. What I have shown here is that, con-
sidered as political decisions, these are indeed nonidentity cases. But this
may not be true of the choices that the policies cause, encourage, or al-
low. Those choices may lead to acts that make people worse off. At the7. Parfit, Reasons and Persons, 362–63.
8. In general, policy-level cases are simply seen as individual cases writ large. For ex-
, Parfit does not distinguish between these cases in Reasons and Persons, or in more
t work on the nonidentity problem (Derek Parfit, “Future People, the Non-identity
em, and Person-Affecting Principles,” Philosophy and Public Affairs 45 [2017]: 118–
or awareness of the difference, see John Broome, Climate Matters: Ethics in a Warming
(New York: Norton, 2012), 64; Otsuka, “How It Makes a Moral Difference,” 209–10.
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choice of a policy and the choice to create someone with a genetic defect.29
Returning to our Faulty Guns case, it is of course unlikely that any
actual war will be one in which each and every in bello action is dispro-
portionate, while the war overall is proportionate. But the conceptual
possibility is an important one, since it reveals that the connection be-
tween ad bellum and in bello proportionality is not as tight, even on
the reductionist picture, as we might be tempted to believe.
The case is also important because while my case of all the in bello
actions being disproportionate may be fanciful, the nonidentity issues
raised by Faulty Guns are all too real. Wars have a huge impact on who will
later exist: they affect both what couples are formed and the timing of
when couples have children. For example, the baby boomers—children
conceived soon after World War II—would not have existed if it were not
for the war. And wars often hugely affect how things will go for future peo-
ple, for good and for ill. In particular, they can make things go badly for
future people through unexploded ordnance, land mines, and the pro-
liferation of guns after combat. Even though the case itself is unrealistic,
the moral issues are real.30
In this section I have focused on claims (8) and (8*), but (provided
that we accept the Difference View) nonidentity cases also show claims (7)
and (7*) to be in tension with the revisionist view of proportionality.




tionsAction A harms Person 1, creates Person 2, and prevents a future
injury to Person 3.
Action B harms Person 1, creates Person 3, and prevents a future
injury to Person 2.Person 1 is made worse off by these actions, both individually and as a
course of action. This harm must be proportionate in order to be justi-
fied. Looked at as a course or collection of actions, Actions A and B pre-
vent injury to persons that are also created by the course of action—a
nonidentity case. Therefore, as a course of action they do not prevent
persons being made worse off; they prevent impersonal loss. But looked
at as individual actions, Actions A and B both prevent someone from
being made worse off. Therefore, we may judge the collection of actions
to be overall disproportionate, as the good of preventing impersonal
loss does not justify the harm to Person 1, but both individual acts may9. I explore these issues in more detail in Patrick Tomlin, “The Impure Non-identity
em,” in Essays in Honour of Derek Parfit, vol. 2, Population Ethics, ed. Jeff McMahan et al.
rd: Oxford University Press, forthcoming).
0. I am grateful to both Michael Robillard and Jeff McMahan for several conversa-
about population ethics and just war.
Tomlin Proportionality in War 53nevertheless be proportionate, as the harms to Person 1 prevent people
from being made worse off.
VI. SO WHAT?
Thus far I have shown that the revisionist view of proportionality in war,
which incorporates claim (6*), is not compatible with some seemingly
plausible claims about the relationship between in bello and ad bellum
proportionality (claims (7), (7*), (8), and (8*)). (As we have seen, those
claims are so plausible that McMahan has sometimes relied on them in
rejecting the traditional view of proportionality, in which in bello pro-
portionality is a nonmoral assessment.)
To summarize, then, we have seen that the revisionist view which in-
corporates this principle,Revisionist in Bello Proportionality
(6*) is a moral assessment (of the same kind as the ad bellum pro-
portionality assessment).is incompatible with:
(7) if every act of a war is proportionate, then the war as a whole
must be proportionate; and
(8) if every act of a war is disproportionate, then the war as a whole
must be disproportionate.To be clear, this does not spell victory for the traditional view of propor-
tionality. After all, the claims with which (6*) is incompatible are also in-
compatible with the traditional view. Furthermore, the primary criticism
of the traditional view, that of missing moral grounds, remains: effective
Nazis still act proportionately and potentially permissibly on the tradi-
tional view, whereas they do not on the revisionist view.
So where does this leave us?
A. Merely Rejecting (7) and (8)?
Revisionists may be tempted to simply reject (7) and (8) and leave every-
thing else as was. After all, while McMahan has previously invoked these
claims in criticizing the traditional view of proportionality, they are not
central either to the primary criticism of the traditional view or to the
positive view of proportionality that revisionists have developed. How-
ever, as I will show, this would be a mistake. We cannot simply reject (7)
and (8) and leave the rest of the revisionist view in place.
To see why, consider cases in which each and every act of war is dis-
proportionate but the war overall is proportionate. If revisionists simply
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ory stands, it appears to say that a state would be justified in ordering the
troops into combat, but that the troops ought to refuse to fight. Further-
more, a moral state ought to require them to refuse and condemn them
for doing precisely as the state ordered. In just war theory the propor-
tionality tests are necessary conditions of permissible action, so if the sol-
diers’ actions would not be proportionate, they ought to refuse to fight.
Consider, for example, one of our bombing raid examples, like
those introduced at the end of Section III, where the later harmful acts
produce very small amounts of good, but the overall war is proportion-
ate. Imagine that the state orders all 100 missions. Each soldier knows
that it is overwhelmingly likely that at least 90 percent of the other sol-
diers will fly their mission. They therefore know that it is overwhelmingly
likely that flying their mission will be in bello disproportionate. Imagine
that each soldier does as he is ordered.
Assuming that the other tests of just war theory had been passed and
that the proportionality of the war was the only potential hurdle, accord-
ing to revisionism as it stands, the following is true: First, the state acted
permissibly in ordering the war, in both the evidence-relative and the
fact-relative sense, since the war as a whole was proportionate. Second,
evidence-relative, at least some of the soldiers ought to have refused
to fight, since their actions were evidence-relative disproportionate. (If
enough had refused, then others would have been evidence-relative per-
mitted to fight.) Third, given that no previous soldier refused, when it
came to their turn, each soldier was evidence-relative required to refuse,
since their acts were evidence-relative disproportionate. Fourth, given
that each soldier flew his mission, each acted fact-relative disproportion-
ately and so fact-relative impermissibly.
The ideal scenario in this example is that the soldiers coordinate so
that enough soldiers disobey their orders to make their colleagues’ ac-
tions proportionate.31 So, at the very least, the state is permitted to order
all 100 missions, but at least some of the soldiers ought to refuse to do
what they are ordered to do. And the state, having ordered them to
do it, ought to condemn them for doing it. However, given that each de-
cides to fly, each has acted both evidence- and fact-relative dispropor-
tionately and impermissibly, while the state that ordered them has acted
evidence- and fact-relatively proportionately and permissibly. The very
state that permissibly ordered them to fly ought to condemn each and
every one for doing so.3231. I am grateful to an Ethics referee for pointing this out.
32. Saba Bazargan and Victor Tadros have argued that soldiers can be permitted to
fight in unjust wars. Here we have the reverse claim: that they can be obligated to refuse
to fight in just wars. Saba Bazargan, “The Permissibility of Aiding and Abetting Unjust
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each and every soldier must perform his part if the valuable ends are to
be secured, and the war as a whole will be proportionate. In this case,
there is no opportunity for soldiers to coordinate so that some obey
and others don’t. If some soldiers disobey, no good will be produced,
and the war will be disproportionate. But if all obey, then each acts dis-
proportionately. All should refuse. But the state, according to revisionist
just war theory, appears to act permissibly in ordering them.
In deciding whether to go to war, the state, according to (1) and
(2), ought to look only at the proportionality of the war as a whole. In
these cases, the state finds the war to be proportionate and so is permit-
ted to go to war. Meanwhile, according to (4) and (5), soldiers ought to
look at the proportionality of their acts of war. And they find, in these
cases, that their acts will be disproportionate, and so they ought to refuse
to fight. Furthermore, a just state ought to expect them to refuse to fight.
This, surely, is an unsatisfactory view of proportionality in just war
theory: states ought to order their troops to do things that they know
their troops ought to refuse to do, and every single soldier is required
to refuse to fight in a war that has passed all the ad bellum just war tests.
Revisionists unsatisfied with this bizarre moral standoff between states
and their soldiers must further revise their views of proportionality.
There are several ways of doing so, and I will explore some of those here.
B. A Master Principle?
If revisionists want ad bellum and in bello proportionality judgments to
line up in the way prescribed by claims (7) and (8), then either they must
further revise the in bello proportionality criterion or they must also re-
vise the ad bellum criterion.
We can ensure that our proportionality calculations satisfy (7) and
(8) by revising our proportionality principles so as to make it analytically
the case that (7) and (8) are true. This can be achieved by establishing
one form of proportionality as a master proportionality principle and de-
fining the other form in terms of the master principle. We could amend
ad bellum proportionality so that it is wholly defined, in its necessary and
sufficient conditions, in terms of in bello proportionality. Or we could
further amend in bello proportionality so that it is wholly defined using
ad bellum proportionality.33
Imagine, for example, if ad bellum proportionality were simply
an amalgam of our in bello proportionality judgments. This would meanWars,” Journal of Moral Philosophy 8 (2011): 513–29; Victor Tadros, “Unjust Wars Worth
Fighting For,” Journal of Practical Ethics 4 (2016): 52–78.
33. I am very grateful to an editor of Ethics for helping me to clarify the views investi-
gated in this section.
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tionally understood—the idea of the proportionality of the “war as a








Revisionist ad Bellum Proportionality: a war is ad bellum dispro-
portionate if and only if the acts of war are, taken collectively, suffi-
ciently in bello disproportionate.I assume that in working out whether the acts of war are “sufficiently” in
bello disproportionate we would want to consider both how many acts of
war are disproportionate and how seriously disproportionate they are.
This principle, however, is unacceptable. Consider wars, like Bomb-
ing Campaign, in which each and every act of war is in bello proportion-
ate. The proposal under consideration would consider that war ad
bellum proportionate, even though, overall, more people are killed than
are saved. This is a reductio of this view. Similarly, this view would allow
that Preemptive Strike was ad bellum proportionate, even though the acts
of war are only proportionate due to them averting threats caused by the
war itself. This suggests that it would be a mistake to make aggregative in
bello disproportionality necessary for ad bellum disproportionality.35
The alternative is to make the ad bellum criterion the primary form
of proportionality and define in bello proportionality in terms of ad
bellum proportionality. This would be to reject (6*). Here is one such
view:Revisionist in Bello Proportionality I: an act of war is in bello propor-
tionate if and only if it contributes to an ad bellum proportionate
war.This principle is implausible because an act of war can be seriously and
egregiously disproportionate while still contributing to a war that, over-
all, stays within the boundaries of proportionality. It would be a mistake,
therefore, to allow contribution to a proportionate war to be sufficient
for in bello proportionality.
However, this principle could be amended as follows:4. Of course, since under this revised principle the state will look at the proportion-
or disproportionality) of all of the individual acts of war, there is a sense in which it
so look at the “war as a whole,” but I hope it is clear enough from the preceding sec-
that this is a very different sense of the “war as a whole” from that which is usually
ed in just war theory. Here is an alternative way of putting the same point: we replace
aditional moral assessment of the effects of the war as a whole with an aggregated as-
ent of the morality of the acts of war.
5. I return later to the question of whether it could be merely sufficient.
3
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tionate if and only if it makes a proportionate contribution to an
ad bellum proportionate war.This principle invokes three different types of proportionality. There is
the proportionality we are trying to define (in bello proportionality),
and this is defined using two other types: traditional ad bellum propor-
tionality, and another, new form of proportionality—which concerns a
“proportionate” contribution. If this view were to be taken on, we would
need to spell out how this third form of proportionality worked.
Both of these attempts to reformulate in bello proportionality, how-
ever, say that for an act of war to be proportionate it is necessary that it
contribute to a proportionate war. This would mean that otherwise just
but disproportionate wars, and unjust wars with no just cause, could con-
tain no proportionate acts of war. But revisionists have convincingly ar-
gued that it can be permissible for soldiers to join unjust wars, when
their contributions will save lives at proportionate cost.36 This idea would
have to be rejected if the revised ideas of in bello proportionality ex-
plored here were adopted.
C. Downgrading Proportionality?
As we have seen, revisionist just war theory, as it stands, is incompatible
with (7) and (8). Straightforwardly rejecting (7) and (8), as I showed
above, leads to a bizarre moral standoff in which a state would be justi-
fied in ordering its soldiers to war, a just war, but each and every soldier
would be required to refuse to fight. But defining one form of propor-
tionality wholly in terms of the other also looks problematic.
Some further revision of just war theory is therefore required. Con-
sider again cases in which the war overall is proportionate but the acts of
war are all disproportionate. One option would be to downgrade the
importance of in bello proportionality and allow that, even though they
know their acts will be in bello disproportionate, the soldiers are per-
mitted to fight. This would be a radical adjustment to just war theory.
At present both ad bellum and in bello proportionality are seen as hard
constraints on permissibility. This option would soften the in bello pro-
portionality principle and allow that soldiers are permitted to commit
disproportionate acts of war so long as they are participating in a propor-
tionate war overall. However, this would be a mistake. Consider a case in
which a group of soldiers save 100 lives each by causing one death. An-
other soldier then kills ten and saves one. This last act is part of a propor-
tionate war, but it is disproportionate and is impermissible in virtue of its6. Bazargan, “Permissibility of Aiding”; Tadros, “Unjust Wars.”
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price to pay.
D. Amending the Structure of Just War Theory?
Amore plausible response to a case in which each act is disproportionate
but the war as a whole is proportionate would be to deny that the state is
permitted to go to war in these circumstances: if it knows that each and
every act of the war it orders will be disproportionate, it ought not to or-
der the soldiers to fight. This would require the state to take account of
the proportionality of the acts of war in deciding whether to go to war.
This, in turn, means that (1) and (2) cannot both be true. The ad bellum
proportionality condition cannot concern the proportionality of the war
as a whole and be the only proportionality standard which must be con-
sulted in a decision as to whether or not we should go to war.
In the distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello there are,
we now see, two importantly different distinctions. The first distinction
concerns which criteria or principles are relevant to decisions about
whether or not to go to war, and which are relevant to decisions regard-
ing acts of war, or participation in war; the second distinction concerns
the “war as a whole” and “acts of war” as units of moral assessment. The
position we are currently exploring says that the disproportionality of
acts of war can be relevant in deciding whether to go to war. This position
therefore relies on us carefully separating out these two distinctions.
Revisionists taking this path must carefully redraw the structure of
just war theory. It is not enough merely to replace the traditional in bello
nonmoral proportionality criterion with a proportionality criterion that
is a moral assessment of the acts of war. Instead, we need to separate the
principles governing resort to war from the principles that take the “war
as a whole” to be their unit of assessment. The moral status of acts of war
can affect the permissibility of a war in a way that cannot be captured by
looking at the “war as a whole.”
This kind of position will need careful refinement. We are accepting
that when each and every act of war is disproportionate, the state ought
not to go to war. If this is so, this is because the state ought not to order
acts it knows are unjustified. We must, however, be careful not to go too
far in this direction.
For example, it would be a mistake to think that whenever a war will
contain any disproportionate or otherwise unjustified acts it is impermis-
sible to start that war. This would lead to contingent pacifism, for surely
we always know when we go to war that at least some disproportionate or
otherwise unjustified acts will result. What we require is a position some-
where in between the extremes—one in which a war composed wholly
of unjustified acts is ruled out, but one in which a war containing some
unjustified acts is not automatically ruled out. This looks a lot like a
Tomlin Proportionality in War 59proportionality principle—a principle that provides limits. However, we
have already rejected a position in which this is the only proportionality
principle relevant to the decision to go to war.
What we need, then, is two independent proportionality principles
for deciding on whether or not to go to war. One looks at the harms and
goods produced by the “war as a whole.” The other looks at the amalga-
mated unjustifiability (including the disproportionality) of the individ-
ual acts of war. In my view, not only is this the most plausible response




tweenUnruly Army: A State Official must decide whether to send her un-
ruly army to war. The unruly army will not obey the laws or morals
of war. They will cause unnecessary suffering, and even when they
achieve good ends, they will often do so at disproportionate cost
to innocent people. However, overall, the war will have a just cause
and will be delivered at proportionate cost.According to just war theory as we find it, whether traditional or revision-
ist, the State Official is clearly permitted to authorize this war. The sol-
diers, under either view, will act impermissibly, but this does not give
the State Official any reason not to send them. Overall, the harms that
they cause will be proportionate, the war will achieve a just aim, and,
we can imagine, the State Official has only considered war as a last re-
sort.37 In my view, that the State Official will cause so much wrongdoing,
so much unjustifiable harm, is a reason not to send her soldiers to war.
And the view we are considering here, in which the State Official must
consider not only the proportionality of the war as a whole but also, sep-
arately, the proportionality (and, more generally, justifiability) of each act
of war, is a position that allows us to factor that into her decision. For ex-
ample, if the war as a whole would be only just proportionate, then the
fact that the acts of war would cause so much unnecessary and dispropor-
tionate suffering would be enough to make the war impermissible.
This view, as we have seen, requires us to rethink both proportional-
ity in war and the structure of just war theory. We now have three propor-
tionality calculations rather than two. We retain the two existing calcula-
tions: the proportionality of the war as a whole, and the proportionality of
acts of war. But we introduce a new proportionality criterion which takes
account of the amalgamated disproportionality (and general unjusti-
fiability) of the acts of war. This proportionality criterion is relevant to7. Thus, while the soldiers could achieve their aims at a lower cost (and so the harms
necessary from their perspective), they are not unnecessary harms from the State
al’s perspective, as she has no other options, and necessity involves comparisons be-
options for achieving the just cause.
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looks at the “war as a whole.”38
We now have two proportionality principles relevant to the decision
to go to war. There are two possible ways of combining them: as indepen-
dent criteria for a just war—individually necessary conditions of permis-
sibility—or as two desiderata that can be traded off against one another,
in order to achieve one overall proportionality assessment of the war,
which will be a necessary condition of the war’s permissibility.
If we accept the former route, there is a sense in which we could still
accept (8). That is, it could still be the case that if every act of war were
disproportionate, the war would be ruled out as impermissible on pro-
portionality grounds. But it would not be (8) as we originally framed
it, for it would not be the case that the war was ruled out because the
“war as a whole” was disproportionate. Rather, it would be because the
“collective acts of war” were unacceptably disproportionate.
As for (7), we would need to reject it. It could be the case that each
and every act of war were proportionate but the war as a whole were dis-
proportionate, ruling it out. This leaves the potential for some of the con-
flicts between what states can and should command, and what soldiers
may do, that we have been trying to avoid. This conflict, I suggest, is best
addressed through additional principles concerning individual soldiers’
acts which connect their permissibility to the wider enterprise of which
they are part. In other words, just as the decision to go to war should
pay attention to the collective acts of war, decisions about acts of war must
pay attention to the war as a whole. Absent special circumstances, one
should not participate in a war that is overall disproportionate, even if
one’s act (and the acts of all others) is proportionate. And so again, we
see that the distinction between jus ad bellum and jus in bello needs care-
ful clarification, for decisions about acts of war must take account of the
“war as a whole.”
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Revisionist just war theory has sought to replace the traditional non-
moral in bello proportionality assessment with a moralized assessment.
On the revisionist view, both proportionality principles demand moral
calculations of the same type, with the ad bellum criterion assessing
the war as a whole and the in bello criterion assessing acts of war. I have
shown that on the revisionist view a war can be ad bellum proportionate,38. An alternative way of putting this point is that just war theory has been sufficiently
inattentive to two different senses of “the war as a whole.” There is the moral assessment of
the effects of the war taken as a whole, and there is the aggregated moral assessment of the
acts of war.
Tomlin Proportionality in War 61even though every act of war is in bello disproportionate, and a war can
be ad bellum disproportionate, even though every act of war is in bello
proportionate.
Revisionists, and Jeff McMahan in particular, have sometimes ap-
pealed to the fact that traditional just war theory has these very same en-
tailments as a reason to prefer revisionist views. As the revisionist views
stand, however, both views have these entailments, and so this is not a
point in favor of either view.
More importantly, the revisionist view as it stands leads to the con-
clusion that states can permissibly order a war, even though they know
that every act of war will be impermissible. Revisionist views, therefore,
require further revision. I have explored several ways in which we might
further revise the proportionality criteria in just war theory. There will, of
course, be other routes I haven’t investigated here open to the revision-
ist. Of the views I have explored here, the most promising involves re-
thinking jus ad bellum proportionality. Jus ad bellum proportionality
has traditionally been thought of as assessing the war as a whole, and
as being the standard which ought to inform decisions about going to
war. I think this is wrong. My cases show that there are questions about
whether we ought to go to war which cannot be answered by looking at
the war as a whole. Whether or not the acts of war will be in bello dispro-
portionate, or otherwise unjustifiable, is also relevant. Therefore, we
should carefully distinguish two independent distinctions in the struc-
ture of just war theory. One distinction concerns the function of the prin-
ciples: some principles are relevant to the decision to go to war, while
others are relevant to decisions about conduct in war. The other concerns
what is being assessed: the war as a whole, or the acts of war.
